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Introduction
The precise relationship between environmental policy, the location of production, and subsequent trade ows remains an open and hot-button issue. Of particular concern is the so-called Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), whereby a reduction in trade barriers enables polluting multinational enterprises (MNEs) to outsource (at least some) production activities to areas with less stringent environmental regulation, thereby altering both the spatial distribution of economic activity and subsequent trade patterns through the creation of havens for polluting rms. Kellenberg (2009, p. 242) states that \the empirical validity of pollution haven e ects continues to be one of the most contentious issues in the debate regarding international trade, foreign investment, and the environment." Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004, p. 6) characterize the debate as \particularly heated."
Proper examination of this relationship is crucial for several reasons. First, understanding determinants of trade patterns and the spatial distribution of MNE activity is imperative in the current economic climate.
In particular, given the dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to trade volumes over the past two decades, understanding the behavior of MNEs is critical. Second, if countries are able to attract (or deter) FDI by manipulating environmental regulations, then international coordination may be necessary to avoid Pareto-ine cient levels of regulation due to transboundary pollutions or other spillovers (e.g., Levinson 1997 Levinson , 2003 . Third, if countries are able to in uence the location of MNE activity and ultimately trade patterns through environmental regulation, then bringing environmental policies under the purview of trade agreements may be necessary to realize the intended e ects of such agreements. Fourth, and related to this prior point, existing institutional structures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be used to impede countries from choosing their desired environmental policies if such policies can be shown to impact trade ows between members.
Finally, a detailed analysis of the PHH has broader implications for the general study of capital competition (e.g., Wilson 1999 ).
Despite the high stakes, the existing literature has been unable to convincingly assess the empirical validity of the PHH for three reasons. First, environmental regulation is complex and multidimensional, making any empirical measure fraught with measurement error. Shadbegian and Wolverton (2010, p. 13) 1 state: \Measuring the level of environmental stringency in any meaningful way is quite di cult, whether at the national, state, or local level." The di culty arises from the fact that di erent regulations typically cover di erent pollutants, regulations may exist at multiple levels (e.g., federal and local), and monitoring and enforcement are imperfect. Along these lines, Levinson (2008, p. 1) states: \The problem is not merely one of collecting the appropriate data; merely conceiving of data that would represent [environmental stringency] is di cult." Xing and Kolstad (2002, p. 3) refer to the measurement of environmental regulation as \no easy task" due to its \complexity." Moreover, depending on the empirical measure employed, the measurement error need not be classical and any bias may be accentuated by the reliance on xed e ects methods in the recent literature.
Second, even if an accurate measure of environmental regulation is available, it may be endogenous for other reasons (e.g., Levinson 2008 ; Levinson and Taylor 2008) . For example, it may be correlated with unobserved determinants of location choice such as tax breaks or other rm-speci c treatments, the provision of other public goods in addition to environmental quality (e.g., infrastructure), agglomeration, the stringency of other regulations such as occupational safety standards, corruption, local political activism, Third, existing studies of the PHH inadequately incorporate geographic spillovers. Recent theoretical models emphasize that the extent of MNE activity in one location depends not just on attributes of that location, but also on the attributes of other potential hosts. Moreover, the predicted direction of the crosse ects is not always in the opposite direction of the own-e ects, a restriction that is implicit in discrete shown to be strongly related to the regulatory stringency of neighboring states (Fredriksson and Millimet 2002 ).
While these shortcomings, particularly the rst and second, are well known, convincing solutions have proven elusive due to the di culty of nding valid exclusion restrictions. In this paper, we simultaneously address these three shortcomings while examining the spatial distribution of inbound U.S. manufacturing FDI across the 48 contiguous states. Geographic spillovers are incorporated in an unrestricted manner by including a spatially lagged counterpart for each state-level attribute. Measurement error, unobserved heterogeneity, and reverse causation concerns are then addressed utilizing three novel identi cation strategies designed to circumvent the need to identify valid exclusion restrictions in the usual sense. As each does so under a di erent set of assumptions, utilizing all three strategies enables us to assess the robustness of the results to the identifying assumptions.
The rst method generates instruments utilizing a di erencing strategy based on Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) . The key identifying assumptions are that the marginal e ects of certain covariates are identical across pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors, and these covariates are signi cantly related to environmental stringency. The second and third methods are based on identi cation strategies that utilize higher moments of the data. Vella's (2009, 2010 ) and Lewbel's (2010) approaches each exploit conditional second moments to circumvent the need for traditional instruments. Identi cation is achieved in the Vella (2009, 2010) approach by assuming that while the errors are heteroskedastic, the conditional correlation between the errors is constant. In the Lewbel (2010) approach, identi cation is achieved through the presence of covariates related to the conditional variance of the rst-stage errors, but not the conditional covariance between rst-and second-stage errors.
In addition to the application, we also undertake a small-scale Monte Carlo study. While the performance of the estimators considered here have been evaluated previously using simulated data, to our knowledge these evaluations have been con ned to the case of a single endogenous regressor. Here, we verify that each method extends to the case of multiple endogenous variables (as in our application). We also undertake a so-called empirical Monte Carlo design based on Huber et al. (2010) that simulates placebo values of the endogenous variables within the real data from our analysis.
The results are striking. In terms of the estimation approaches, we indeed verify that all three identication strategies perform well in settings with two endogenous variables. In addition, the performances of the Klein and Vella (2009) and Lewbel (2010) approaches are comparable to the performance of a traditional instrumental variable (IV) estimator when strong, valid exclusion restrictions are available.
In terms of the application, using state-level panel data, we consistently nd (i) evidence of environmental regulation being endogenous when examining the behavior of pollution-intensive industries, (ii) a negative impact of own environmental stringency on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive sectors, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) signi cantly larger e ects of environmental regulation once endogeneity is addressed. Neighboring environmental regulation is not an important determinant of FDI (although the estimates are relatively imprecise in the analysis and the empirical Monte Carlo study).
However, spillovers from other attributes are present (although not the focus of this study), indicating the importance of incorporating spatial e ects more generally in models of FDI determination. Thus, while not homogeneous (as in Henderson and Millimet (2007) and Ederington et al. (2005) ), environmental regulation is a signi cant determinant of location choice by some MNEs at least at the regional level. As such, policymakers should be concerned about the incentives for localities to set regulation at Pareto-ine cient levels and governments to in uence trade patterns in highly pollution-intensive industries through the strategic manipulation of environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review, concentrating on prior studies attempting to address endogeneity concerns. Section 3 describes the empirical methods, the data, and the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Literature Review
The literature assessing the empirical validity of the PHH has yet to reach a consensus due to the numerous complexities confronted by researchers. 1 Levinson (2008) e ectively separates the literature into rst and second generation studies. The rst generation encompasses cross-sectional studies treating environmental regulation as exogenous. These studies typically found no statistically meaningful evidence in support of the PHH (and sometimes found counter-intuitive e ects). The second generation predominantly encompasses panel data studies designed to remove unobserved heterogeneity invariant along some dimension (most often time, but occasionally across sectors di erentiated by pollution intensity). Panel approaches, however, require environmental regulation to be strictly exogenous conditional on the (typically time invariant) unobserved heterogeneity (and other covariates). A few studies within this second generation have attempted to relax this assumption and utilize traditional IV approaches. These second generation studies typically nd economically and statistically signi cant evidence in support of the PHH.
As mentioned, it is unlikely that existing panel studies are su cient to yield unbiased estimates of the impact of environmental regulation on the location of economic activity and/or subsequent trade patterns. The omission of third-country e ects, the omission of variables that vary over time or di erentially a ect pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors such as tax breaks and agglomeration e ects, measurement error in proxies for environmental regulation, and dependence between current environmental regulation and past (or current) shocks to economic activity point strongly to violations of strict exogeneity Recognizing this, several studies test the PHH utilizing traditional exclusion restrictions. These studies are summarized in Table 1 . At the risk of over-simplifying the literature, the instruments used generally fall within three categories. The rst set includes lagged environmental regulation or lags of other covariates Despite the suspect validity of the identi cation strategies employed in these prior studies, rigorous speci cation testing is noticeably absent in many. A few discuss the strength of the rst-stage relationship and/or conduct Hausman-type tests for endogeneity, but most neglect to test or even discuss why the proposed instruments should be exogenous or excluded from the second-stage equation for location choice or trade patterns; Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Kellenberg (2009) are notable exceptions. Nonetheless, these studies nearly universally obtain a more detrimental e ect of environmental regulation on the behavior of pollution intensive sectors once endogeneity is (attempted to be) addressed. Given this background, we now turn to our analysis.
Empirical Analysis

Structural Model
To x ideas, a typical model used to assess determinants of (continuous) measures of FDI stocks or ows with panel data is a standard two-way xed e ects speci cation:
where F DI is some measure of MNE activity in location i and time t, x k , k = 1; :::; K, are time-varying observable attributes of location i, i and t are location and period xed e ects, respectively, and ' it is the error term. A proxy for environmental regulation is one element in x. As is well known, consistent estimates of the parameters in (1) requires x to be strictly exogenous.
As discussed previously, the model in (1) is potentially awed due to the exclusion of geographic spillovers. The omission of spillovers is one reason why the strict exogeneity assumption may fail in practice. Thus, we begin by augmenting (1) to include spatially lagged counterparts for each covariate:
where
! is the weight given by location i to neighbor j in period t, includes the set of neighbors of location i, and " it is the new error term. Even if all elements in the regressors in the augmented model are strictly exogenous, estimation of (2) is nonstandard given the introduction of the weights, !. To proceed, the weights must be chosen a priori.
As is well known in these types of models, the choice of the weights is ad hoc; thus, the spatially lagged variables are potentially measured with error. Prior to discussing the weighting schemes utilized, two comments are warranted. First, if the weights are mis-speci ed, this would likely attenuate the estimates of k to zero, as we are essentially looking for evidence of spillovers in the wrong place. Thus, the estimates should be interpreted as lower bounds (in absolute value). However, if we nd evidence of geographic spillovers, then this is not particularly problematic. Second, as discussed below, since we are treating own and neighboring environmental regulation as endogenous, we are able to recover consistent estimates (under the assumptions of the estimators utilized) of neighboring environmental regulation as long as the signal-noise ratio is not negligible.
That said, we utilize three straightforward weighting schemes. First, we assign a weight of zero to non-contiguous neighbors and equal weights to all contiguous neighbors. In other words, P j ! ijt x jkt simpli es to the mean of x jkt in neighboring states. Second, following Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) , we adopt two regional breakdowns for the 48 mainland U.S. states (see Appendix A). The use of regional weights is also motivated by the evidence in Glick and Woodward (1987) that foreign-owned a liates in manufacturing tend to serve regional markets. For each regional breakdown, P j ! ijt x jkt simpli es to the mean of x jkt in all other neighbors within the same region (again, giving each regional neighbor equal weight). The two regional classi cations come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Crone (1998 Crone ( /1999 . The BEA regional classi cation system was introduced in the 1950s and has never been amended. While this classi cation system is widely used by economists in studying regional economic activity, Crone (1998 Crone ( /1999 ) devised an alternative regional breakdown for U.S. states using cluster analysis to group states according to similarities in economic activity. We refer to these weighting schemes as BEA and Crone regional weights, respectively.
Even with speci cation of the weights, estimation of (2) is complicated by the fact that own and neighboring environmental regulation are likely correlated with the error term, ", due to measurement error, spatial error correlation, unobserved heterogeneity, and/or reverse causation. Thus, traditional xed e ects estimates are not likely to yield consistent estimates of and . Before discussing our approach to identi cation, we brie y discuss the structure of the data as this will make the empirical approaches easier to document. We then present each estimation method along with its results.
Data
The data come directly from Keller and Levinson (2002) ; thus, we provide only limited details. Summary one. In any event, nding statistical evidence consistent with the PHH, particularly using data on PP&E, would appear to require the existence of signi cant selection (on either observed or unobserved variables) into more stringent RAC.
Estimation
Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach
Model The rst identi cation strategy used to address the potential endogeneity of own and spatially lagged environmental regulation is based on the approach put forth in Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990). Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) are concerned with the impact of an endogenous household-level variable on children di erentiated by gender. Lacking a traditional exclusion restriction, the solution proposed entails examining the di erential e ect of the endogenous variable on sons versus daughters and generating exclusion restrictions by assuming that some exogenous household-level covariates have identical e ects on boys and girls. In our application, we apply this logic to assess the di erential e ect of own and spatially lagged environmental regulation on two types of FDI: FDI in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors. Valid exclusion restrictions are generated by assuming that some exogenous state-level covariates have equal e ects on FDI across these two sectors.
Formally, we re-write the structural model in (2) separately for pollution-intensive (P ) manufacturing sectors and non-pollution-intensive (N P ) manufacturing sectors:
Thus, x 1 includes a subset of x for which the marginal e ects on FDI are allowed to di er depending on the pollution intensity of the industry. The marginal e ects of covariates included in Subtracting (4) from (3) in each time period yields
In (5) x 2ikt and P j2 ! ijt x 2jkt , k = 1; :::; K 2 , are available as exclusion restrictions. 3 This identi cation strategy relies on choosing a set of exogenous controls, x 2 , and imposing the restrictions that
If the restrictions imposed lead to an overidenti ed model (i.e., there are at least two variables in x 2 ), then the usual overidenti cation test constitutes a test of the restrictions imposed.
To see this, note that if 2k or 2k does in fact di er across sectors di erentiated by pollution intensity, then the error term in (5) will contain terms such as 2k x 2ikt or 2k P 48 j=1 ! ijt x 2jkt and the resulting instruments will be correlated with the error.
While this approach aids in the generation of instruments for environmental regulation, it does so at a cost (even if the restrictions are valid). Speci cally, the approach only provides consistent estimates Results The results are presented in Panels A (PP&E) and B (employment) in Table 2 . The speci cations estimated correspond to (5) except that the di erenced state xed e ects, e i , are replaced with region dummies. Thus, we are assuming that time invariant attributes that di erentially a ect sectors according to their pollution intensity are constant within regions. Estimation is performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) which has been shown to perform relatively well in small samples with weaker instruments (e.g., Stock et al. 2002; Flores-Lagunes 2007) . The variables in x 2 include market proximity, population, and tax e ort as such variables should be equally relevant to all manufacturing industries. Four speci cations are estimated. Speci cation 1 omits all geographic spillovers.
Speci cations 2-4 include such spillovers, where Speci cation 2 uses the contiguous weighting scheme and Speci cations 3 and 4 use the BEA and Crone regional weighting schemes, respectively. Finally, note that we only display the point estimates for own and neighboring environmental regulation to conserve space.
Full estimation results are available upon request.
Turning to the results, four ndings emerge. First, the OLS estimates are negative and statistically signi cant, as well as signi cantly larger in magnitude than the estimates reported in Keller and Levinson (2002) . This di erence follows from a change in the de nition of the dependent variable, as well as the fact that the model in (5) eliminates time-varying unobservables that are correlated with both FDI and environmental regulation, but a ect FDI equally across sectors (e.g., local macroeconomic shocks or political corruption). In addition, the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci cations; neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi cant only in Speci cation 2.
Second, the identi cation strategy works well as determined by the usual IV speci cation tests, particularly when using employment to measure FDI. Speci cally, we reject the null that the model is underidenti ed at the p < 0:01 con dence level in every case using Kleibergen and Paap's (2006) rk statistic, and the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistic is reasonably large. In addition, we fail to reject the validity of the instruments using Hansen's overidenti cation test in all cases when using employment to measure FDI, and in Speci cations 2 and 3 in Panel A at the p < 0:05 con dence level. Thus, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach fares well in the current application. Third, in both panels, we reject exogeneity of own environmental regulation in Speci cation 1 and own and neighboring environmental regulation in Speci cations 2-4. Thus, strict exogeneity of own and spatially lagged environmental regulation is overwhelmingly rejected.
Finally, the LIML estimates are statistically signi cant at the p < 0:01 con dence level using either the traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments. Moreover, the point estimates are considerably larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates in absolute value; however, the standard errors are also roughly four to ve times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is rarely statistically signi cant although the estimates are very imprecise.
While the point estimates for own environmental regulation are economically large, and we will return to the issue of precision later, it helps to put the magnitude in context since the dependent variable is now the log di erence in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive FDI. The results are presented in Table 3 . 4 Of the eight models estimated using LIML, the instruments pass the overidenti cation test in ve. In these ve models, only one of eight coe cient estimates related to own or neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi cant at even the p < 0:10 con dence level. This is only marginally greater than is to be expected by chance. Thus, we interpret this as evidence in favor of the identi cation strategy. To proceed, we re-write the FDI equation given in (2) together with the rst-stage speci cations for own and neighboring environmental regulation to make matters explicit. The system of equations is
ln(
where RAC is the measure of relative abatement costs, X includes all the other regressors from x in (2) except RAC (i.e., including the spatial terms and the state and time xed e ects), and 1 and 2 are the error terms in the rst-stage equations assumed to be correlated with ". As stated, the model is not identi ed since there are no exclusion restrictions in (7) and (8) . However, Lewbel (2010) shows that if 1 and 2 are heteroskedastic and at least a subset of the elements of X are correlated with the error variances but not with the error covariances, then the model is identi ed.
Formally, the Lewbel (2010) approach entails choosing z r X such that
for r = 1; 2. If these assumptions are satis ed, then e z r (z r z) r , r = 1; 2, are valid instruments. If the errors contain a common (homoskedastic) factor, along with heteroskedastic idiosyncratic components (where the heteroskedasticity of r depends on z r ), then these assumptions will be satis ed. Formally, if
we can re-write the errors in (6) { (8) as
it + e rit ; r = 1; 2;
where is homoskedastic, e r , r = 1; 2, is heteroskedastic (with variance depending on z r ), and e r , r = 1; 2, and e " are independent of each other and , then (9) and (10) are satis ed. This data-generating process (DGP) is plausible if represents homoskedastic measurement error in environmental stringency, or a composite index of unobserved variables impacting both environmental stringency and FDI (such as those discussed previously) is drawn from an identical distribution across observations. However, the idiosyncratic shocks to environmental stringency may be drawn from di erent distributions.
In the analysis, we use the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables signi cantly related to the rst-stage error variances. We include land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity in z 1 ; the spatially-lagged counterparts are included in z 2 . The instruments, e z r , are then created by replacing r with its estimate obtained from (consistent) OLS estimates of the rst-stage. See Appendix B for further estimation details.
Prior to continuing, it is interesting to note { with further examination { that land prices and total road mileage are associated with a lower variance of 1 ; neighboring land prices and total road mileage (market proximity) are associated with a lower (higher) variance of 2 . In Keller and Levinson (2002) , land prices and total road mileage are negatively associated with FDI in ows, whereas market proximity is positively related. Thus, the pattern of heteroskedasticity is consistent with the notion that states with less favorable attributes for attracting FDI minimize the volatility in another attribute, environmental stringency, that may adversely impact inbound FDI.
Results
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 , where the di erent panels and speci cations are identical to Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 contains the results for the chemical sector only; Table 5 assesses total manufacturing. In the tables, the OLS estimates are presented for comparison, where the Speci cation 1 results are identical to Keller and Levinson (2002) . The estimates obtained using the Lewbel (2010) approach are given under the column labelled`IV'.
As with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, four salient ndings emerge. First, the OLS estimates are negative and statistically signi cant in the vast majority of cases. The main exception is when examining FDI as measured by employment in total manufacturing (Panel B, Table 5 ). In addition, the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci cations; neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi cant only in Speci cations 2 and 3 when assessing employment in the chemical sector Table 4 ). Inclusion of the spatial e ects has little e ect on the estimated marginal e ect of own environmental regulation.
Second, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the Lewbel (2010) identi cation strategy works well as determined by the usual IV speci cation tests when geographic spillovers are omitted (Speci cation 1) as well as in the majority of cases when spatial e ects are included (particularly when using the two regional weighting schemes in Speci cations 3 and 4). Third, when focusing on the cases that pass the speci cation tests, we reject exogeneity of own (and neighboring) environmental regulation in the majority of cases for the chemical sector. There is much less support for endogeneity when examining total manufacturing. Thus, there is only strong evidence of endogeneity when focusing on the most pollution-intensive sectors.
Finally, turning to the point estimates in the cases that pass the speci cation tests for the chemical sector (Table 4) , the LIML estimates are statistically signi cant at at least the p < 0:10 con dence level using either the traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments; often statistically signi cant at the p < 0:01 con dence level. Moreover, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the point estimates are larger in absolute value compared to OLS; however, the standard errors are also roughly two to three times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi cant in Speci cation 3, but not Speci cation 4. Thus, choice of weighting scheme does matter in meaningful ways.
To put the magnitude of the e ects in context, we return to the previous thought experiment. Using the results in Panel B, Speci cation 4, if Ohio in 1991 had raised the value of its RAC index from 0.86 to match California (1.00), then employment in foreign-owned a liates in the chemical sector would have been expected to decline from 17,600 to roughly 15,100. In contrast, the OLS estimate implies a decline to only about 16,500.
In terms of the total manufacturing results (Table 5) , we often fail to reject exogeneity as noted previously. Moreover, adding the spatial e ects has little in uence on the estimates from Keller and the system of equations given in (6) { (8). In addition to being mean zero, the following assumptions are made concerning the errors:
S " (z it )=S r (z it ); r = 1; 2; varies across i (13)
where " it and rit are homoskedastic errors and z X. Thus, at least some of the errors are required to be heteroskedastic in such a way that the ratio S " (z it )=S r (z it ), r = 1; 2; varies across observations. However, the conditional correlation, r , r = 1; 2, between the underlying homoskedastic portion of the errors must be xed. Note, while the three heteroskedasticity terms { S " (z it ) and S r (z it ), r = 1; 2 { are written as a function of the same set of covariates, z, this need not be the case. There are no restrictions on which variables may enter each of these terms. Klein and Vella (2010) give some examples of DGPs satisfying these assumptions. One such case arises if there exists a common factor, as in the Lewbel (2010) approach. However, here the common factor enters multiplicatively and may itself be heteroskedastic. Speci cally, if we can write the errors as
where e " and e r are mean-zero, independent of X and , and have a constant correlation given by r , then (11) { (14) are satis ed.
Reverting back to (14) , it is worth considering what this identi cation condition implies. One possible interpretation includes viewing " it and rit , r = 1; 2, as correlated measures of agglomeration. Agglomeration may a ect environmental stringency due to the scale e ect of pollution-generating activity. However, the impact may depend on state-level attributes, z it . For instance, states with attributes that are not conducive to attracting FDI may limit the impact of agglomeration on environmental stringency. Similarly, own agglomeration may impact FDI through economies of scale, but the e ect may depend on state-level attributes as well. Neighboring agglomeration may adversely impact FDI by improving the desirability of neighboring locations. However, once we condition on these state-level attributes, the return to own and neighboring agglomeration, 1 and 2 , respectively, are constant. While not testable, this seems plausible.
Continuing, we parameterize S " (z it ) and S r (z it ) as
S r (z it ) = p exp(z rit r ); r = 1; 2
where z 1 (z 2 ) includes own (spatially lagged) land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity (as in the Lewbel (2010) approach). Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables likely to be related to the structural error variance in the FDI equations, we include average production worker wages, population, and market proximity in z " when examining FDI in the chemical sector; market proximity only is included when examining total manufacturing FDI. 6 With this setup, (6) may be rewritten as ln(F DI it ) = X it + ln(RAC it ) + ln(
where 1
is a control function and e e " it is a well-behaved error term. Given the functional form assumptions in (15) and (16), (17) Results The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 under the column labelled`CF'. In Table 4 (chemical sector), the point estimates are fairly stable across the four speci cations, particularly in Panel A (PP&E) and especially when one considers the size of the standard errors. 7 Moreover, while the coe cients on own environmental regulation are roughly similar to those obtained using the Lewbel (2010) approach, they are never statistically signi cant at the p < 0:10 con dence level due to the relatively large standard errors. Neighboring environmental regulation is also never statistically signi cant (although the estimates 6 Average production wages and population are excluded when examining total manufacturing FDI due to problems with convergence.
7 Standard errors are obtaining using 1000 bootstrap repititions.
are even more imprecise) and inclusion of the spatial e ects has little in uence on the estimated marginal e ects of own environmental regulation.
In terms of total manufacturing (Table 5) , the results are consistent with the OLS and Lewbel (2010) approaches, particularly when considering the size of the standard errors. Thus, there is no statistically meaningful evidence of a negative impact of own environmental regulation, or of neighboring environmental regulation, on FDI in ows across the manufacturing sector as a whole.
In sum, the three identi cation strategies provide a consistent picture: own environmental regulation 
Monte Carlo Study
Prior to concluding, we undertake two small-scale Monte Carlo experiments for two reasons. First, given that the identi cation strategies utilized herein are somewhat unorthodox, it is worthwhile to illustrate their performance using simulated data. Second, as stated in the Introduction, existing analyses or applications of these methods focus nearly exclusively on the case of a single endogenous regressor; we verify that each method extends to the case of two endogenous variables. Note, however, due to the usual limitation of Monte Carlo evidence { the fact that results may be speci c to the DGPs considered { our aim is not to set up a`horse-race' between the di erent approaches. Rather, our aim is simply to verify the performance of each approach in a setting where the identifying assumptions hold.
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The rst Monte Carlo design is based on the following data-generating process:
Outcomes: Covariates : x 1 ; x 2 iid N (0; 1) We perform this exercise twice; once using 1000 simulations of sample size 750 (roughly the size in our application) and once using 100 simulations of sample size 5,000. For comparison, we also simulate analogous data sets with traditional exclusion restrictions. In this case, the rst-stage data-generating process becomes (2010) approaches, we obtain the traditional IV results using LIML.
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The results are presented in Table 6 ; OLS results are also included for comparison. The simulations indicate that all three (non-OLS, non-traditional IV) estimators perform well overall and similarly to traditional IV. In the small sample, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and Lewbel (2010) the focus is on the performance of several estimators of the e ect of a binary regressor, the simulations entail restricting the sample to only those observations for whom their actual value of the regressor is zero, arbitrarily recoding the regressor to one for a subset of this sample, and then estimating the e ect of the simulated binary regressor. In light of this setup, the`true' e ect of the simulated regressor is zero.
In our application, the process is a bit more complex for three reasons: (i) there are two variables of interest, (ii) the variables of interest are continuous, and (iii) our estimators require modeling the simulated variable in a particular way for identi cation. To proceed, we use the following algorithm:
1. For each observation i, i = 1; :::; N T , in the real data, simulate a value for RAC by drawing a value from its empirical distribution. In practice, this entails drawing a random number, s, between 1 and N T and de ning the simulated value of RAC for observation i as the value of RAC from observation s.
2. For each observation i, i = 1; :::; N T , in the real data, simulate a value for neighboring RAC by drawing a value from its empirical distribution following the procedure in step 1. OLS results are presented in Table 7 , as well as for the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches.
Note, now OLS is the preferred estimator since the DGP eliminates the endogeneity issue. Table 8 21 more precise estimates of the e ect of own environmental regulation relative to neighboring environmental regulation. This is especially true when using the Crone regional weighting scheme. Thus, some caution should be exhibited concluding that spatial e ects are unimportant in empirical models of the PHH (as was already suggested by the large standard errors discussed previously).
Conclusion
The debate over the empirical validity of the PHH is heated and for good reason; the answer has far-reaching consequences at the local, national, and international levels. To date, however, empirical assessments of the PHH have been hampered by the lack of a credible identi cation strategy to overcome potential problems associated with measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the empirical literature on the PHH has yet to adequately incorporate lessons from the literature on so-called third-country e ects.
Here, we propose three novel identi cation strategies couched within a model that incorporates spatial While informative, continued research is warranted. First, the analysis here is at the regional level. (2004) uncover heterogeneous e ects utilizing nonparametric and semiparametric methods, respectively. Some of this heterogeneity is captured in this study; namely, di erential e ects by pollution intensity of the manufacturing sector as well as by measure of FDI (PP&E versus employment). However, other dimensions of heterogeneity uncovered by the prior literature cannot be addressed given the data and identi cation strategies utilized here. Future research investigating whether the empirical evidence of heterogeneous e ects continues to be present once measurement error, spatial e ects, and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for is needed for a deeper understanding of the linkages between environmental and trade policy. 
23
B.2 Klein & Vella (2009) Approach
Estimation of the empirical model
proceeds as follows:
1. Regress ln(RAC it ) on X it and obtain b 1it
2. Regress ln( P j2 ! ijt RAC jt ) on X it and obtain b 2it 
. Estimate " (again) by regressing ln b " 2 it on z "it , where
and compute b
6. Estimate via OLS:
+ e e " it :
7. Compute standard errors via bootstrap. Table 2 for further details. Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01. See Table 4 for further details. 
